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Abstract 
Introduction 
Gregory H. Chun, Mark J. Eppli and 
James D. Shilling 
This article examines the variation in rents per square foot among 
regional shopping centers in the United States in response to 
variation in retail sales per square foot. The analysis breaks new 
ground by treating base and percentage rents as endogenous 
functions of retail sales. The analysis further distinguishes 
between de facto, if not de jure, fixed and percentage leases, and 
between new versus existing leases. Simulation results suggest 
that shopping center rents can easily increase in the short-run as 
retail sales decrease, or they can easily decrease as retail sales 
increase. In addition, the results suggest that shopping center 
rents per square foot generally react more aggressively to an 
increase in retail sales per square foot over time than to a 
decrease in retail sales per square foot, all else equal. 
This article is concerned with the effects of variations in retail sales on the time 
path of shopping center rents. On the basis of a variety of evidence, including a 
recent article by Wheaton and Torto (1995), the case for examining the 
relationship between retail sales and shopping center rents is compelling. 1 Between 
1968 and 1993, for example, retail sales in regional shopping centers in the United 
States (in constant dollars per square foot) fell by 20% to 40%, while rents per 
square foot (constant dollars) almost doubled. Since then shopping center rent and 
retail sales changes, for many retailers, have been such that rents and retail sales 
are now, as it were, just in balance. For other retailers, changes in shopping center 
rents have continued to outpace changes in retail sales. Still for other retailers, 
the changes in shopping center rent and retail sales would appear to be on the 
"yellow brick road" leading back to an eqUilibrium level (see Exhibits 1-10). 
As an explanation for some of these trends-particularly, the tendency for changes 
in shopping center rents to deviate noticeably from changes in retail sales in the 
short-run-this article develops a theoretical model of shopping center rents, with 
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Exh I b It 1 I Rents vs. Sales Per Square Foot: Specialty Foods 11961 = 100) 
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numerical parameters. The objectives of the article are to describe the model and 
to present a variety of simulations results based on it. 
The particular model specified here and the simulation results obtained relate 
wholly to regional shopping centers in the U.S. The model has several antecedents 
in the literature (Benjamin, Boyle and Sirmans, 1992; Brueckner, 1993; and Miceli 
and Sirmans, 1995). However, it breaks new ground by (1) treating base and 
percentage rents as endogenous functions of retail sales; (2) distinguishing 
between de facto, if not de jure, fixed and percentage leases; and (3) relaxing 
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Ex h I b It 2 I Rents vs. Soles Per Square Foot: ladies Specialty Wear (1961 = 100) 
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Ex h I bit 3 I Rents vs. Sales Per Square Foot: ladies Wear 11961 = 100) 
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assumptions regarding lagged effects. The model is also unique in that it is 
estimated completely with cross-section data. The model is used to generate a set 
of ex post forecasts over time. Our major findings are: 
1. There is not a direct proportionality between changes in retail sales and 
shopping center rents, at least not in most cases and particularly not in 
the short-run. In the short-run, shopping center rents can easily increase 
as retail sales decrease, or they can easily decrease as retail sales increase. 
2. The analysis here suggests that a given percentage increase in retail sales 
per square foot raises rents per square foot over time, all else equal, with 
the rent increases in the short-run being greater for shopping centers 
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Exhibit 4 I Rents vs. Sales Per Square Foot: Children's Wear 11961 = 100) 
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Exh I b It 5 I Rents vs. Sales Per Square Foot: Men's Wear (1961 = 100) 
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experiencing nsmg retail sales per square foot than for centers 
experiencing constant (or declining) retail sales per square foot. 
3. In the long run, shopping center rents per square foot generally react more 
aggressively to an increase in retail sales per square foot over time than 
to a decrease in retail sales per square foot, all else equal. 
These conclusions are, of course, subject to several limitations. First, the theory 
underlying the analysis deals with rents per square foot and retail sales per square 
foot for individual stores over time, yet the variables we measure are at a point 
in time (except for retail sales per square foot) and apply to aggregate data. 
Second, we use cross-sectional data to make inferences about how rents per square 
Ex hI bIt 6 I Rents vs. Sales Per Square Foot: Family Apparel (1961 = 100) 
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Exhibit 7 I Rents vs. Sales Per Square Foot; Family Shoes 11961 = 1001 
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foot would change from one equilibrium at a point in time to another eqUilibrium 
at a later point in time. This use depends on the assumption that the cross-sectional 
observations themselves represent equilibria. Third, to the extent that the estimated 
parameters in our cross-sectional model change over time, our approach would 
not necessarily be the best way to track a true rental price trend.2 
An Economic Model for Analyzing Retail Rents 
The model is mainly based on a model of regional shopping centers proposed by 
Brueckner (1993), although similar ideas are presented in Benjamin, Boyle and 
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Exhibit 9 I Rents vs. Sales Per Square Foot; Sporting Goods 11961 = 100) 
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Sinnans (1992), Miceli and Sirmans (1995) and Chun (1996).3 The theory assumes 
that the shopping center owner behaves as a perfectly discriminhting monopolist. 
Thus, instead of facing a horizontal demand curve for retail space, each shopping 
center owner faces a negatively sloped demand curve. This demand curve depends 
on the quantity of space that is allocated to the store as well as on the space 
allocated to other stores in the center (the latter reflecting the presence of inter-
store externalities). 
To maximize profits, the shopping center owner quotes an individualized rental 
price per square foot of space to each store and then allocates the store the amount 
of space it demands at that price. The equilibrium condition is: 
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"DJ(Q)-::-~S/ i)Qj = -O"~ 'i'~s> i)'Qj"-- j"='-i:'2:~:'~'~ ,-~:' -_····(1)--1 
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where Dj(Q) is store j's inverse demand curve for space, Sj = SiQI' Q2' .•. , Qn) 
is the sales volume of storej, Q is the vector (QI' Q2' •.• , Qn) of space allocations, 
and 0 is the total operating cost per square foot.4 This condition says that stores 
with a high externality-generating ability have a low marginal cost of space. 
Consequently, these stores are encouraged to expand through low rents. 
We are particularly interested in the case in which Sj depends not only on the 
allocation of space within the center, but also on store effort levels. In this case, 
the necessary condition for maximization of shopping center profits is rj = Pj -
{3jS/ Qj' where Pj is the minimum base rent payment (per square foot) and {3j is 
the overage rate. In addition, {3j must satisfy: 
where 5j gives the effect of higher store j effort on sales elsewhere in the center. 
This condition shows that stores whose effort levels generate the most externalities 
(e.g., large anchor department stores) receive rental contracts with the largest 
percentage-of-sales subsidies. 
Formulating the problem in this manner overlooks two important points. First, in 
actual contracts, the overage rate applies only above some threshold level of sales, 
not to total sales. Second, actual contracts are negotiated at various points in time, 
not all at once. Because these assumptions seem unwarranted in most instances, 
it is useful to add some additional structure to the model. 
To this end, consider the following setup. Suppose we have a set of retail leases 
at time period t of n different ages. Suppose also that all retail leases specify a 
base rent and additional rent calculated as a percentage of retail sales above a 
given level of sales. We shall first discuss the size of the minimum rent required 
on these leases, leaving until later the discussion of additional percentage rents. 
Let p(k, t) represent the minimum rent required on a k year old lease. We can get 
a simple model for the determination of p(k, t) by assuming that: 
where Set - k) equals the actual retail sales (per square foot of gross leasable 
area) in period t - k. This choice of p(k, t) implies that base rents are stepped 
up (or may be stepped down) to {3 percent of sales at each renewal date. 
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The next step is to sum the value of p(k, t) for leases signed in period I through 
I - 11 + 1. This gives us a general base rent formula: 
where p(/) is today's total base rental income and a; is the number of leases (as 
a percent of the total number of leases) either renewing or renewed in period I -
i. Next, we note that Equation (4) can be transformed into a regression equation 
by assuming that the lag weights, a;, can be approximated by evaluating a 
polynomial function at the appropriate discrete points in time. 
To estimate Equation (4), we assume that a; = Co + cli + ci2 for i = 0, 1, 
2, ... , II - 1 and a; = ° for i less than ° and greater than 11 - 1. Substituting 
and rewriting Equation (3), we get: 
p(/) = 'Y + (3co(S(/) + S(t - 1) + ... + S(I - II + 1» 
+ (3c l (S(t - 1) + 2S(t - 2) 
+ ... + (ll - I)S(t - II + 1» 
+ (3ciS(1 - 1) + 4S(t - 2) 
+ ... + (11 - 1)2S(1 - 11 + 1» + e(/), (5) I 
where 'Y is a constant term and e, is a normal error term. This specification has 
the advantage of not imposing a restrictive functional form on the estimates of a, 
yet it allows the traditional polynomial specification of lag weights. 
The major estimation problem here is having enough data to complete the 
specification of the distributed lag effect. The choice of a second-degree 
polynomial is, of course, arbitrary and may be set according to convenience. In 
the initial experimentation, third and fourth-degree polynomials were tested, but 
they generally did not improve the statistical fit of the equation. 
The basic rental data, which are described in greater detail below, consist of rent 
rolls for a cross-sectional survey of U.S. shopping centers for 1995 plus time-
series data on Set). From this data, we can estimate Equation (5). Assuming e 
obeys the classical assumptions, the parameters of this function will be the best 
linear unbiased estimates. Given estimated values for Co' C I and c2, it is a simple 
procedure to calculate ak • To do this, we assume that Lk:(~ ak = 1.5 The alternative 
is to assume that {3 = 1 and allow the estimated lag weights to incorporate the 
effect of the true parameter {3. Additionally, from the variance-covariance matrix 
of c, it is a simple procedure to calculate the standard errors for each a.6 
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In estimating Equation (5), a number of values of n arc tried, the first 
corresponding to 11 = 6, the longest lag we could obtain for retail sales. In order 
to assess the sensitivity of our results to this assumption, we also estimated 
Equation (5) assuming lags of four and five years (most specialty store tenants in 
a regional shopping center sign leases for five to ten years). 
Turning now to the calculation of total rent, we let r(k, t) denote the total rent for 
leases originated in period t - k. The expected level of r(k, t) is defined by the 
following relationship: 
r(k t) = {P(k, t) + (3(S(t) - S*(k, t» for S(t~ > S*(k, t) (6) 
, P (k, t) otherwise. 
where S*(k, t) is the actual sales breakpoint specified in the lease. Now, summing 
over k, we have: 
·;(;)"~'·~~;i·o·:·-t)·~··~':;(·i:~)'~-~-.. ~ ~n'~I~(;I' ~-1, t), _ ... _"'--(7)-'J 
-.-,~ .".-,. .......... - .... ~,.. .. ~ ,., ......... , .... ,,, .... ,'!'" ,~ ... -. 1- ......... - - '.-•••• -- ~" .. ,--, - ", ~'~-"'"--~""""" -," "--. .. -.- .... ,-~ .. -----.~-__ ,_ .......... 
which can be used to make forecasts of total retail rents, both forward and 
backward in time beginning at time t, and to test for the responsiveness of rents 
to changes in retail sales. 
Finally, we point out that the model in Equation (7) can lead to situations where 
the actual rate of change of r(t) may be opposite of that of S(t). First, we note 
that any arbitrary .1S(t) implies an associated Llp(t) of the form: 
. _dp = ,-P (.:.....t _+_I~)_--,p--,(~t) 
dS Set + 1) - S(t) 
[ 
(S(t) - Set - n + I)] 
g + Set) 
= an-I (3, g (8) 
where g denotes the percentage rate of change in Set), i.e., g = .1S(t)/S(t). This 
result implies that dp/dS = a n- l {3 » 0 only when S(t) = S(t - 11 + I) and an-I 
> 0, otherwise the value of dp/dS could be positive or negative, depending on 
the perturbation in Set) - S(t - n + 1) over the term of the lease. For example, 
in the case where g is negative, but where Set) - Set - 11 + 1) is positive, it is 
quite possible for dp/dS to be negative, implying p(t) should increase, rather than 
decrease, beyond t. By analogous reasoning, it also is quite possible for the reverse 
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to occur. That is, g could be positive, while Set) - Set - n + 1) could be negative, 
implying a decrease in pet) beyond t. This indeterminacy prevails whether actual 
contracts are negotiated all at once, i.e., an-I = 1, or at various points in time. It 
is only when we choose to work with 12 = 1 period leases instead of n = 5 or 
n = 10 period leases that dp/dS unambiguously becomes positive. In this special 
case, dp/dS takes on the value of {3, regardless of the past values of S(t), and with 
dp/p = (dp/dS)(dS/S)(S/p), dS/S = g, andp/S = (3, this implies dp/p = g, which 
is a very intuitive result. 
Next, moving on to the relationship between the value of ret) and Set), it is 
important to distinguish between two separate cases: one where Set) < S*(k, t) 
for all k and one where Set) :::= S*(k, t) for all k. All other cases are simply some 
combination of these two. Where S(t) < S*(k, t) for all k, we have that: 
dr r(t + 1) - r(t) 
- = ---"-----'------'-'-
dS S(t + 1) - Set) 
[ 
Set) - Set - 12 + 1)] 
g + S(t) 
= an_I (3. g (9) 
This result is, of course, nothing but a replay of Equation (8). This is because, 
when Set) < S*(k, t) for all k, no tenant pays any overage, and, so, any effect of 
a higher Set) on ret) through higher overage rents is brushed aside, and the value 
of dr/dS in Equation (9) is automatically equal to the value of dp/dS in Equation 
(8). 
A different outcome emerges, however, when Set) :2! S*(k, t) for all k. In this case, 
we have: 
dr r(t + 1) - r(t) 
- = ~-~-----'''':;'' 
dS Set + 1) - Set) 
g + Set) 
[ 
S(t) - S(t - n + 1)] 
= (1 - a n - I ){3 + all_I g {3. (10) 
This result enables us, assuming S (t) = S (t - 12 + I), to write drl dS = (3. But 
this suggests that drl r, the rate of change in ret), should be equal to g, the rate 
of change in retail sales. This provides the intuition for Equation (10). For a value 
of Set) > Set - n + 1), on the other hand, the resulting value of dridS can be 
positive or negative, depending on the value of g. Likewise, for a value of 
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Set) < S(t - 11 + 1), the resulting value of dr/dS can also be positive or negative. 
Again, such results are critically dependent on the value of g. 
As the data will show, another important parameter in this regard is the breakpoint! 
sales ratio, defined as S *(k, 1)/ S (I). Theoretically, the higher this ratio, the more 
gradual is the change in rents-the argument being that a change in retail sales 
will produce an immediate change in r(k, t), only if Set) rises above S*(k, t) (or 
if Set) starts out above S*(k, t»; otherwise, r(k, I) will only gradually change as 
leases are renewed and as p(k, t) is stepped up (or stepped down) to Set). 
In the following sections, we turn to several numerical simulation analyses of the 
theoretical model. These simulations highlight interesting and nontrivial 
interactions of theoretical parameters, and also the difficulty involved in attempts 
to develop robust aggregate implications from such a framework. But before 
proceeding to the simulation analyses, we shall try to give an empirical account 
of the theoretical model and parameter values. 
Estimation and Empirical Results 
Data Description 
The basic data assembled for this study, mean values of pet), ret), Set) and 
S*(k, 1)IS(t) for tenants in U.S. regional shopping centers for 1995, are shown in 
Exhibit 11. The exhibit also contains average store size (in gross leasable square 
feet) and average lease term for various principal tenant types. The exact definition 
of each variable, the source of the data, their nature, and their derivation are all 
stated in considerable detail in the notes to the exhibit.7 Here the values are 
arranged according to major groups: department stores, clothing and accessories, 
shoes, home furnishings, home appliances/music, building materials/hardware, 
hobby/special interest, gifts/specialty, jewelry, drugs, personal services, food and 
food services.s 
The data presented in Exhibit 11 show that jewelry stores, home furnishings, fast 
food restaurants and other services (including optical stores, pet shops, flower 
shops, stationers and news stands) are among the highest sales volume tenants 
(per square foot) in a regional shopping center. The mean sales volume, for 
example, for home furnishings and jewelry is between $650 and $800 per square 
foot of gross leasable area. The mean sales volume of all non-anchor tenants is 
$265 per square foot. Low sales volume tenants (excluding department stores) 
include women's wear, women's specialty and gifts.9 
Because jewelry stores, fast food restaurants and other services are among the 
highest sales volume tenants in a regional shopping center, it comes as no surprise 
to find that they also are among the highest total rent tenants in a regional shopping 
center. The lowest total rent tenants (in rents per square foot) in a regional 
shopping center arc department stores that lease space from the shopping center 
JRER Vol.21 No.3 - 2001 
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ExhIbit 11 I Selected Characteristics of the Data 
Breakpoint Sales 
Ratio 
Average Minimum Total Space 
Merchandise Type Sales Rent Rent Occupied 1994 1995 
Family apparel 521 32.1 38.6 3623 1.25 2.22 
Specialty apparel 430 34.4 37.6 2843 1.36 2.85 
Men's wear 463 32.4 41.4 2944 1.64 3.48 
Women's wear 279 22.3 24.4 5006 2.03 2.84 
Women's specialty 319 29.4 31.1 2668 1.69 3.04 
Shoes 419 30.2 34.0 2174 1.97 2.00 
Gifts 383 32.6 35.1 2176 1.77 2.64 
Home furnishing 651 52.3 59.6 3926 0.99 2.05 
Jewelry 796 68.6 77.6 938 1.40 1.75 
Leisure & 418 35.0 39.6 3390 2.40 5.79 
entertainment 
Restaurant 413 21.3 27.6 7800 1.49 1.27 
Fast food 617 59.5 70.5 1026 1.41 1.66 
Specialty food 441 43.0 46.0 1016 1.66 2.05 
Drug / Variety 564 49.7 53.3 9801 2.44 2.22 
Services 523 82.5 34.1 1428 3.25 3.86 
Others 831 71.3 91.1 1534 1.50 2.90 
Mean 504 43.5 46.4 3268 1.77 2.66 
Noles: All data are supplied by a large regional shopping center developer. All values (except for 
space occupied) are measured per square Aoor of gross leaseable area. Except where otherwise 
noted, all data shown here pertain to 1995. 
,'-, ... ~ .~. ,,-- ~ .. -. . ,. ~ .. ' _ .... _. -". _. ~ ~- . 
-'" . ~- _.-
owner. to Total rent charges per square foot of gross leasable area for department 
stores that lease space from the shopping center owner are S3.20, or about one-
seventh of that paid by specialty apparel stores. Similar rent differentials are 
documented by Benjamin, Boyle and Sirmans (1992), who argue that such a 
pattern arises because department store anchor tenants in most regional shopping 
centers generate benefits for other stores by attracting consumers to the center. 
These shopping externalities mean that the true marginal cost of space allocated 
to a department store is quite low. 
Another interesting comparison is between the average breakpoint/sales ratio for 
different non-anchor tenant types. The values of this ratio range from a low of 
1.27 for restaurants to a high of 5.79 for leisure and entertainment. These values 
are believed to have an upward bias, due partly to new tenants, and partly to the 
Retail Sales and Shopping Center Rents 175 
use of partial year sales. For this reason, we also report the average breakpointl 
sales ratio on leases in their first full year of operation. The values of this ratio 
(again for non-anchor tenant types) range from a low of 0.99 for home furnishings 
to a high of 3.25 in services, with a mean value of 1.77 (see Column 5 of Exhibit 
11). These results suggest that retail sales, on average, must grow by 7.50% to 
12% per annum over the remaining term of the lease-and in some cases as much 
as 16% per annum-if the tenant is ever to pay percentage rents. In the 1995 
environment of, say, 3% expected inflation, it seems clear that most tenants will 
never pay overage rents. While most stores in a regional shopping center may be 
offered percentage-of-sales contracts rather than fixed rental contracts (see 
Benjamin, Boyle and Sirmans, 1992; and Miceli and Sirmans, 1995), these are 
generally far, far "out of the money" options and might reasonably be viewed as 
fixed rent contracts. This evidence is also difficult to reconcile with the view that 
percentage rent payments are smallest for stores that generate the most 
externalities (see Brueckner, 1993). 
We assume in the rest of this article that the units of observation are regional 
shopping centers. This means, of course, that the variability of the data is greatly 
reduced. Nevertheless, there are many reasons why rents per square foot and sales 
per square foot will vary among regional shopping centers. Among the most 
important are differences in age of the shopping center, and recent rates of 
population and income growth. We proceed by regressing these average rents on 
present and past values of aggregate retail sales in a manner consistent with the 
statistical model described. 
Empirical Estimates 
We estimated Equation (5) on our cross-section of shopping centers, with no 
endpoint priors. The results are presented in Exhibit 12. In all cases, the structure 
of the underlying model seems to fit the data reasonably well. The lag weights 
implied by the second-degree polynomial distributed lag model in Exhibit 12 are 
given in Exhibit 13, with standard errors reported in parentheses. It is apparent 
that lag length has a minor impact on the coefficient estimates. Nonetheless, 
several points should be made. First, Equations 1 and 2 in Exhibit 12 trace out a 
humped distributed lag. Both lag structures peak at a lag of one year, and then 
decline thereafter. Looking at the actual estimates, we find that the lag weights in 
Equation 1 turn negative after three years, while those in Equation 2 turn negative 
after two years. Second, the coefficients in Equation 3 result in a monotonically 
declining lag structure. The lag weights (on the assumption that the as sum to 
one) range from 0.42 in period t to 0.01 in period t - 4. In period t - 5, the lag 
weight is -0.11. Third, for the sum of the unadjusted coefficients (i.e., for the 
expression f3 ~k:J ak)' the respective values for Equations 1-3 are 0.061, 0.064 
and 0.062. These are valid for a regional shopping center setting. They imply a 
percentage rental rate ranging from 6.05% to 6.40% of retail sales, which is 
entirely plausible. 
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Exhibit 12 I Estimates of Retail Rents 
Coefficient Estimates Summary Statistics 
Constant Co c. C2 C3 R2 Adj. R2 F-Value MSE 
2.18 0.026 -0.005 -0.000 68.1 66.1 34.83 3.54 
(1.42) (2.09) (-0.32) (-0.10) 
2 1.97 0.019 0.013 -0.005 69.0 67.1 36.42 3.49 
(1.29) (1.43) (0.61) (-1.05) 
3 2.20 0.016 0.030 -0.013 68.5 66.5 35.47 3.52 
(1.41) (0.97) (0.62) (-0.46) 
4 1.94 0.011 0.081 -0.050 0.007 69.8 67.3 27.80 3.48 
(1.28) (0.71) (1.50) (-1.67) (1.67) 
5 2.09 0.014 0.050 -0.031 0.004 69.2 66.5 26.91 3.52 
(1.34) (0.82) (0.57) (-0.52) (0.44) 
6 2.19 0.016 0.029 -0.012 -0.000 68.5 65.8 26.06 3.55 
(1.39) (0.90) (0.12) (-0.05) (-0.D1) 
Noles: The dependent variable is minimum rents per square Foot. Estimates are per square foot. The t-Statistics are in parentheses. N = 52. 
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Exh Ib It 13 I Responses to logged Changes in Refail Sales 
2 
3 
Number of Logs 
o 
0.026 0.021 
(2.11) (3.37) 
0.019 
(1.43) 
0.016 
(0.98) 
0.026 
(.4.75) 
0.033 
(1.76) 
Noles: Responses arc per square fool. 
2 
0.015 
(1.01) 
0.023 
(1.74) 
0.025 
(1.39) 
3 4 
0.008 0.001 
(0.35) (0.02) 
0.009 -0.016 
(0.41) (-0.41) 
-0.009 
(-0.32) 
5 
-0.007 
(-0.16) 
A simple ordinary least squares regression can also be used to estimate Equation 
(5). The computational burden is considerably less than polynomial distributed 
lag estimation techniques and the approach can be applied to models with a 
modest number of lags. In Exhibit 14, we report the ordinary least squares 
estimates of shopping center rents per square foot. It is worth noting that the 
estimated lag weights in this case incorporate the effect of the true parameter {3. 
As such, these lag weights are not directly comparable to those reponed in Exhibit 
12. Moreover, these lag weights are estimated with less precision (which is why 
we prefer the results reported in Exhibit 12). Still, if we restrict ourselves to the 
sum of the estimated lag weights, we see from Exhibit 12 that the values of {3 
are within plausible ranges. The estimates of {3 range from a low of 0.059 (with 
one lag) to a high of 0.064 (with five lags). 
Changes in Rents Due to Changes in Retail Sales 
Here we present a series of simulations to examine the relationship between 
changes in retail sales per square foot and changes in rents per square foot over 
time. Our approach is to assume that the as and the {3 estimated in the last section 
are constant over time. We then use Equations (5)-(7) to measure the impacts of 
changes in Set) on ret). For each simulation we report the calculated values of r 
(t) and briefly consider the time it takes for r(t) to adjust to a new equilibrium. 
Scenario 1: One-time Increase in Retail Sales 
Four sets of simulations arc considered here: 
1. Base forecast. In this first experiment, we simulate Equations (5)-(7) 
under the assumption that there is a one-time increase in retail sales per 
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Exhibit 14 I OlS Estimates of Retail Rents Per Square Foot 
Coemcient Estimates Summary Statistics 
Constant Co c. C2 C3 C4 Cs f?2 Adj. f?2 
3.64 0.06 63.2 62.5 
(2.46) (9.36) 
; 2 
i 2.12 0.02 0.05 68.3 67.1 
(1.42) (1.01) (2.84) 
3 2.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 68.4 66.4 
(1.35) (1.06) (0.61) (0.32) 
;4 2.20 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.01 68.5 65.8 , 
(1.39) (0.90) (0.62) (0.45) (-0.37) 
5 2.09 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.01 69.2 65.9 
(1.32) (0.78) (0.74) (0.41) -0.16 (-1.03) 
; 6 1.85 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 69.9 65.9 
(1.16) (0.73) (0.73) (0.54) (-0.32) (-1.45) (1.04) 
Notes: The dependent variable is minimun rents per square foot. The t-Statistics are in parenthesis. N = 53. 
F-Value MSE 
87.55 3.73 
53.90 3.49 
35.32 3.52 
26.06 3.55 
21.08 3.55 
17.78 3.55 
Sum of aj 
0.059 
0.064 
0.064 
0.064 
0.061 
0.064 
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square foot of 10%. In addition, this simulation has S*(k, 1)/S(t) = 1.75, 
n = 6 and as == 0. 11 The simulation also uses historical values for past 
S(t - k). 
2. Natural breakpoint experiment. In this experiment, the value of 
S*(k, t)/S(t) is reduced from 1.75 to 1.00 as a sensitivity test. 
3. Shopping centers with growing sales. This experiment is identical to 
Simulation 1 except now, instead of using historical values for retail sales 
per square to forecast r(t), we assume that past sales per square foot were 
growing at 10% per year. This more rapid growth in retail sales per square 
foot should result in a more rapid growth of r(t). 
4. Shopping centers with stagnant sales. In this last experiment, we 
assume that past retail sales per square foot are constant. The other 
parameters are the same as in experiment 3. The objective is to examine 
how r(t) adjusts in shopping centers with stagnant sales per square foot. 
The results of the first two simulations are presented in Exhibit 15. The 
simulations suggest that rents are normally very slow to adjust to a new 
equilibrium. For instance, in our baseline simulation a one-time increase in retail 
sales per square foot of 10% causes rents to increase by slightly more than 8% 
over a six-year period. Of this increase, something like 20% of the adjustment 
occurs after three years, and then another 20% occurs in years four and five, with 
the remainder of the adjustment occurring in year six. 
Under Simulation 2, we see that there is no adjustment lag effect. Here a one-
time increase in retail sales per square foot of 10% leads to an immediate increase 
in rents per square foot of about 8%, as one would expect. When the breakpoint 
ExhIbit 15 I Response to One-time Increase in Retail Sales of 10% 
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!sales ratio is set equal to 1.00, the expression for ret) simplifies to ret) = f3S(t) 
for Set) > S*(k, t); and ret) = p(t) otherwise. Given this, a one-time increase in 
Set) of 10% should increase rents per square foot by f3 percent. Furthermore, this 
increase should occur all at once, rather than being spread out over several years. 
Note that in our case ret) goes up by slightly more than ~ percent owing to our 
simplifying assumption that as = O. 
Our next two simulations address the question of path-dependency. From 
Equations (5)-(7), it is clear that the calculated values of ret) are enhanced by 
higher past values of Set). The procedure we propose to illustrate this is to simulate 
values of ret) using two different growth rates in past retail sales: one assuming 
a high growth rate and the other assuming a low (or zero) growth rate. These 
experiments suggest that, when past sales are constant, a 10% increase in retail 
sales per square foot causes rents per square foot to increase by slightly more than 
8%, but that, when the same 10% increase in sales follows an annual growth rate 
in past sales of 10%, the percentage change in ret) is approximately 18% (see 
Exhibit 16). The explanation is that p(k, t) rises markedly upon lease renewal in 
the latter experiment, but not in the former experiment. 
Scenario 2: One-time Decrease in Retail Sales 
We now consider the effect of a one-time decrease in retail sales of 10% on rents 
per square foot. We do this by simulating the same four scenarios as above but 
with a one-time decrease in retail sales of 10% instead of a one-time increase in 
sales of 10%. 
In our baseline simulation (with S*(k, t)/S(t) = 1.75, and as = 0), a one-time 
decrease in retail sales per square foot of 10% causes average rents per square 
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Exh I bit 16 I Effect of Post Growth Rates in Retail Sales on Rent Increase 
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foot to fall by less than 1 % after three years, and by less than 3% after years five 
(see Exhibit 17). The surprising result is that by year six, the full impact of the 
decline is less than 5.5%. This result suggests that, because the base shifts, 
percentage increases and decreases in rents are not symmetrical (compare the 
results in Exhibit 15 with those in Exhibit 17). 
Our next exercise is to simulate the rent adjustment process when the breakpoint! 
sales ratio, S*(k, 1)IS(I), is set equal to 1.00. Other than starting out at a slightly 
higher rate, these results do not vary much from the previous result. 
We also simulate the change in r(l) resulting from a one-time decrease in sales, 
with and without a fairly large run-up in S(I) just prior to the fall in S(I) (see 
Exhibit 18). In the former case, rents per square foot actually rise in years two to 
five, before falling in year six. In the latter case, rents fall throughout, before 
stabilizing in years six to ten. These results are generally sensible. The temporary 
increase in rents in the former case comes about as old leases with low minimum 
base rents renew. They then decline thereafter as newer leases rollover at lower 
minimum base rents. In the latter case, both old and newer leases rollover at lower 
minimum base rents. Consequently, r(t) decreases monotonically over time. 
Scenario 3: Actual Change in Retail Sales 
In this simulation, we start out with data on actual retail sales per square foot for 
the years 1963-1995 from UU's survey of regional shopping centers. Average 
rents per square foot are then projected for the years 1968-1995 to the same 
tenant mix and quality of space that characterizes the regional shopping centers 
in Simulation 1. 
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Exhibit 18 I Effect of Past Grovvth Rate in Retail Sales on Rent Decrease 
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The results of this simulation (deflated by the CPI deflator) are given in Exhibit 
19. It is possible to get a rough idea of the relation between rents per square foot 
and sales per square foot over this time period by calculating a Pearson correlation 
coefficient in the following way. Note that observationally retail sales per square 
foot show less of a decline (in constant dollars) during the 1980s and 1990s than 
during the 1960s 'and 1970s. Also, during the 1980s, retail sales per square foot 
increased slightly, only to turn downward again in the 1990s.12 We find a Pearson 
correlation coefficient between our estimate of current rents per square foot and 
Ex h I b It 19 I Simulated Shopping Center Rents vs. Actual Sales Per Square Foot (1968 = 100) 
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actual sales per square foot of 0.97 (with a p-value of 0.0001) during the period 
1968-1980. In contrast, similar calculations for the period 1981-1995 show a 
Pearson correlation coefficient between our estimate of current rents per square 
foot and actllal sales per square foot of 0.18 (with a p-value of 0.52). Over the 
entire 1968-1995 period, it appears that the Pearson correlation coefficient 
between our estimate of current rents per square foot and actual sales per square 
foot is 0.86 (with a p-value of 0.0001). 
These results are noteworthy in several respects. First, the results suggest much 
the same predictions about the effects of retail sales growth on shopping center 
rents as in our first two scenarios-faster retail sales growth is associated with 
roughly proportionate higher rental growth, while a decline in retail sales will 
cause a roughly proportionate decline in rents. Second, as regards short-run 
dynamics, a faster rate of growth in retail sales will, at least in some neighborhood 
of time t, cause ret) to increase. This is attributable to the fact that any increase 
in ret) is conditional on the sluggishness inherent in the underlying retail lease 
agreements, which in some sense is the core point of the article. Third, the results 
indicate that ret) will overshoot its new, lower, equilibrium value and converge 
downward to it, when S(t - 11 + 1) < S(t + 1) < Set). Similarly, ret) will 
undershoot its new, higher equilibrium vallie and converge upward to it, when 
Set - Il + 1) > Set + 1) > Set). As regards the time path of r(t), from Exhibit 
17 it is seen that while movements in S (t) do not induce exactly equal movements 
in the value of ret), the two values remain inextricably linked when looked at over 
the entire time period. This occurs, in large part, because the vallie of r(t) is 
projected to the same tenant mix and quality of space, which is in stark contrast 
to Exhibit 1-10. 
Conclusion 
This article has accomplished the following. We began by developing an economic 
model of retail rents. This model, which follows Brueckner's (1994) treatment of 
the optimal allocation of space in a regional shopping center, was then estimated 
using cross-sectional data on average rents per square foot combined with some 
corresponding time-series data on sales per square foot. 
Interestingly, the evidence suggests that average rents per square foot in a regional 
shopping center generally do not respond immediately to a change in the income-
generating capacity of the shopping center, but rather the response is "smoothed" 
out over time. Perhaps the most obvious reason for this rent smoothing is that 
most retail lease agreements in regional shopping centers are de facto, if not de 
jure, fixed lease arrangements. Part of this smoothing behavior also occurs because 
not all retail leases agreements are negotiated all at once. Consequently, during 
periods in which sales per square foot in a regional shopping center are rising 
(falling), average rents per square foot for most retail leases that are already in 
place will tend to remain relatively fixed. However, it is noted that some 
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adjustment in rents does occur as leases rollover (at which time minimum base 
rents are adjusted to some fixed percentage of retail sales). 
We then used our cross-sectional estimates to make inferences about how rents 
per square foot would change from one equilibrium at a point in time to another 
equilibrium at a later point in time. This use depends on the assumption that the 
cross-sectional observations themselves represent equilibria, and that the model 
itself can be applied through time (i.e., that none of the parameters changes 
dramatically through time). The evidence suggests that average rents per square 
foot are not nearly as tied to retail sales as most observers would believe. The 
findings provide a useful perspective from which to view the theoretical models 
of retail rents reported above. 
Endnotes 
I A potential problem with Wheaton and Torto's (1995) analysis is that their data are not 
based on the same shopping centers over time, and, therefore, are not very comparable. 
Furthermore, in the 1960s and 1970s most regional shopping centers included one or 
more variety stores, one or more drug stores, and one or more supermarkets as leading 
tenants. During the 1980s and 1990s, most regional shopping centers repositioned 
themselves by shifting their emphasis from supermarkets, which have very high sales 
per square foot but low rent per square foot, to smaller specialty stores, like apparel 
stores, accessories, music and shoe stores, which have low sales per square foot but high 
rents per square foot. Then too, a noticeable movement has occurred away from the 
traditional arrangement in the 1960s and 1970s in which a department store leased space 
from the shopping center owner in the same general manner as other stores in the center. 
The current development trend is toward arrangements whereby the department store 
building is owned by the store itself, not by the shopping center owner, and one might 
expect this to have caused reported rents per square foot in regional shopping centers 
to rise over time. 
2 This is in contrast to the main problem associated with longitudinal studies of shopping 
center rents, which is the difficulty of comparing rents and retail sales in a newly 
developed shopping center with those in a shopping center that has, over time, become 
more fully developed. The quality of the shopping center being different in the two cases 
is a source of error that can easily lead to the notion that rents have risen somewhat 
paradoxically over time, while what has, in fact, happened is that the risk of locating at 
that center has gone down markedly between the two dates, thereby causing shopping 
center rents to rise. 
3 See also Eppli and Shilling (1995). They investigate the optimal time to develop a large 
regional shopping center. 
4 Note that 0 is constant cross-sectionally, presupposing a single tenant improvement 
allowance. The theory also presupposes that all tenant improvements are paid for by the 
shopping center owner. 
S As written, it is impossible to estimate Uk and {3 directly unless it can be assumed that 
LZ,:J Uk = 1. 
6 The calculated standard errors are a function of the variance-covariance matrix of the 
Retail Sales and Shopping Center Rents 185 
cs, appropriately weighted by the estimated values of Co' CI and c2• We can write the 
expression for var (a) as var (a) = var (co + cli + ci2) = var (co) + P var (cl) + 
i4 var (c2) + 2i COl' (co. c l ) + 2P cov (co, c2) + 2P COl' (C., c2) for i = 0, 1, 2, ...• 
n - 1. 
7 The data are proprietary, obtained from a single large shopping center developer/owner. 
Because the developer has asked to remain anonymous, many details cannot be made 
explicit. Information was collected not at the shopping center level, but specifically at t 
the tenant level. 
g The data cover 178 stores and 8,538 specialty store tenants. Among the largest anchor 
tenants in the sample are JC Penney, Inc., Sears, Roebuck & Co., Dillard Department 
Stores, Federated. The May Department Stores, Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., Dayton 
Hudson Corporation and Nordstrom, Inc. Among the specialty store tenants included 
are The Limited, F. W. Woolworth, Intimate Brands, The Gap, The Musicland Group, 
Edison Brothers Stores, Inc., County Seat and Borders. 
9 Pashigian and Gould (1995) use reported sales per square foot from ULI's survey of 
shopping centers and find similar sales differentials across the various tenant types. 
10 Six out of ten department stores in the sample own their own stores and the land 
underneath. Many department stores in the sample fall in both categories. That is, they 
lease space from some shopping centers, while owning their own stores in other 
shopping centers. For example, Montgomery Ward and Co., Inc. and JC Penney, Inc., 
own approximately 60% of their stores operated within the sample. 
II Setting as equal to zero was done as a matter of convenience. While this formulation 
causes a slight overstatement in the calculated values of ret) (see text for more details), 
none of the qualitative results are changed when r(t) is calculated assuming as = 0 
compared with those when ret) is calculated assuming as = -0.1138. 
12 The decrease is especially noticeable during 1993-1995. One might have expected this 
decrease given the shifting priorities of the Baby Boomers away from apparel toward 
family-oriented home and electronic purchases. 
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